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Abstract 
Many  experiments  show  that  consumers  consider  relative  price  differences  even  when  only 
absolute price differences are relevant from an economic perspective, a phenomenon that was 
denoted  "relative  thinking."  These  experiments,  however,  were  conducted  using  hypothetical 
questions. To test whether the relative thinking bias also exists in real-world situations, a field 
experiment  where  subjects  could  purchase  either  a  bagel  or  a  bagel  with  cream  cheese  was 
conducted.  The  monetary  addition  for  the  cream  cheese  was  kept  constant  ($0.20)  in  both 
treatments, but the bagel's price varied ($0.05 in one treatment and $0.30 in the other). Relative 
thinking then implies that more people should add the cream cheese when the bagel's price is 
higher, because the relative price increase for the cream cheese is then smaller. However, the 
results  did  not  document  any  relative  thinking  –  more  people  (in  percentage  of  those  who 
purchase) added the cream cheese when the bagel's price was lower (the difference between the 
treatments,  however,  was  not  statistically  significant).  A  replication  of  the  experiment  as  a 
hypothetical-scenario experiment did document relative thinking, suggesting that introduction of 
financial incentives might alleviate relative thinking.   2
1. Introduction 
In almost every purchase decision, consumers face various alternatives, which usually differ 
in their characteristics and prices. Even at the same store one could usually find various types of 
bread, soft drinks, toothpastes, TV sets, and so on, and when considering alternative stores the 
number of alternatives is even larger. The same applies to services – in most places there are 
many  restaurants to choose from and in  each restaurant a variety of items on the menu, for 
example. Because the choice between differentiated goods or services is so common, it is very 
important to understand how consumers make these choices.  
When a consumer faces two differentiated goods and one is preferred to the other but is also 
more expensive, utility maximization implies that he should compare the extra utility from using 
the better good, to the utility he can derive from using the price difference to consume other 
goods.
1 The relative price difference between the goods should not matter; only the absolute price 
difference matters. For example, suppose that there are two substitute goods, the price of the less-
preferred one is p, and the consumer tells us that he is exactly indifferent between the two goods 
when the preferred good costs p+x. Then, if the price of the less-preferred good changes to q, the 
consumer should be indifferent between the two goods when the preferred good costs q+x.
2 The 
reason is that the difference in utility between the two goods is fixed, and so is the utility the 
consumer can derive by using x dollars towards consumption of other goods.  
                                                 
1 For simplicity I discuss only two alternative goods, but of course the idea applies also when more alternatives exist.  
2 This assumes that we can ignore wealth effects, an assumption that can be justified for most goods, since the good’s 
price is negligible compared to the consumer's lifetime wealth.   3
To  illustrate  this  idea  more  vividly,  suppose  that  a  consumer  is  indifferent  between  two 
flights, where one costs $209 and leaves at 7 am and the other costs $249 and leaves at 10 am 
(the consumer has to wake up a few hours before the flight in order to catch it, and is willing to 
pay up to $40 to sleep three more hours). Now, suppose that the consumer, a month later, has to 
choose  again  between  two flights that  are  identical except  for  their  departure time,  and  that 
anything  else  remains  unchanged, except  that  the 7-am  flight's  price  is  $627.  The  consumer 
should be indifferent between the two flights if the 10-am flight costs $667, because he is willing 
to pay up to $40 for three more hours of sleep.  
Product differentiation can come from many sources other than departure time; one simple 
example is the location in which the goods can be purchased. If one store is more conveniently 
located than another and the consumer is indifferent between the two when a certain good costs 
$20 in one store and $25 in the other, then he should also be indifferent between the two stores 
when buying another good that costs $270 and $275 in the two stores.
 3  
While normatively, utility maximization and well-defined preferences imply that consumers 
should exhibit this simple principle, several experiments showed that people often deviate from it 
and exhibit “relative thinking” – thinking about relative price differences in addition to absolute 
differences (Azar, 2004).
4 Tversky and Kahneman (1981), for example, asked people whether 
they would drive 20 minutes to save $5 on a calculator when they were going to buy a calculator 
and a jacket. When the calculator’s price was $15 and the jacket’s price was $125, 68 percent of 
                                                 
3 The higher price is in the preferred store, obviously, otherwise the consumer is not indifferent. 
4 See Azar (2007) for a literature review, a theoretical framework and some further discussion of relative thinking, 
and Azar (2008) for a discussion why “relative thinking” seems to be a better terminology than “mental accounting,” 
which was sometimes used to describe the same behavior.    4
the subjects were willing to drive, but when the calculator’s price was $125 and the jacket’s price 
$15, only 29 percent wanted to drive 20 minutes to save $5 on the calculator. This result was later 
replicated  in  several  other  studies.  Mowen  and  Mowen  (1986)  showed  that  the  effect  holds 
similarly for student subjects and for business managers. Frisch (1993) showed that the effect 
holds also when only a calculator is being purchased. Ranyard and Abdel-Nabi (1993) varied the 
price of the second item (the jacket) and obtained similar results, and Darke and Freedman (1993) 
found that both the percentage discount and the absolute discount have an effect on consumer 
choice.  
Azar (2006a) showed that when subjects can choose to purchase in a store they currently visit 
or in a remote store, the minimal price difference for which they are willing to travel to the 
remote store is an increasing function of the good’s price. In an experiment that included nine 
different price-treatments, he quantified this effect and found that people behave on average as if 
the value of their time is approximately proportional to the square root of the good’s price. Azar 
(2004) showed that consumers’ willingness to add for a high-quality good (over the price of a 
low-quality good) is higher when the good’s price is higher. The quality difference was unrelated 
to the good’s price, and therefore, from a normative perspective, the willingness to add for the 
higher quality should be independent of the good’s price. He conducted the experiment both with 
undergraduate students and with participants in the 2003 North American Summer Meetings of 
the Econometric Society and showed that economists also exhibit this behavior. Azar (2006b) 
argues that response of firms to relative thinking of consumers can explain the finding of Pratt, 
Wise and Zeckhauser (1979), Pan, Ratchford, and Shankar (2001), Sorensen (2000) and Aalto-
Setälä (2003) that price dispersion is positively correlated with the average price (or cost), a 
finding that is otherwise hard to explain from the perspective of search theory.   5
The experiments described above, however, were conducted without financial incentives.
5 
There are several possible reasons for this. One reason is that many of the researchers cited above 
are psychologists, and in psychology it is a common practice to conduct experiments without 
financial incentives.
6 Another possible reason is that the questions subjects faced were simple 
questions that did not require a significant amount of effort to answer correctly. Therefore, there 
is no apparent reason why introducing financial incentives should make responses more accurate 
or change them in a systematic manner. A third reason is that subjects were asked about their 
preferences, and since these were unknown to the experimenter, he could not reward the subjects 
based on how close their responses were to the correct answers (their true preferences).  
The issue of whether and how financial incentives affect behavior, and in particular violations 
of  rationality,  is  a  controversial  issue  among  economists  and  psychologists.  Tversky  and 
Kahneman (1987, p. 90), for example, argued that “experimental findings provide little support” 
for the view that “observed failures of rational models are attributable to the cost of thinking and 
will thus be eliminated by proper incentives.” Similarly, Thaler (1994, p.155-157, 190) wrote, 
                                                 
5 Financial incentives mean that the subject has monetary rewards to answer correctly. Therefore, paying a constant 
show-up fee is not considered financial incentives. One study that used financial incentives and is worth mentioning 
is Hossain and Morgan (2006). While their focus was on the perception of shipping charges versus the good’s price 
and not on the perception of price differences between differentiated goods, their results are somewhat related to 
relative thinking. They find that for higher-priced items, where the shipping fee is a relatively small percentage of the 
total price, announcing a high shipping fee in an auction results in higher total revenue than with a low shipping fee. 
However, this no longer holds for lower-priced goods for which the high shipping fee is a large percentage of the 
total price. This finding suggests that the percentage of the shipping fee from the total price affects behavior even 
though a fully-rational consumer should not be affected by this percentage.  
6 Hertwig and Ortmann (2003), for example, report that in a sample of 106 empirical studies on Bayesian reasoning 
published in psychology journals, fewer than three percent provided financial incentives.   6
“To see whether the addition of monetary incentives would improve decision making, numerous 
researchers, both psychologists and economists, have run parallel experiments with and without 
incentives… the violations of rationality observed tend to be somewhat stronger in the incentive 
condition…” Later, Thaler added “Hypothetical questions appear to work well when subjects 
have  access  to  their  intuitions  and  have  no  particular  incentive  to  lie,”  and  afterwards  he 
concluded, “… the assertion that systematic mistakes will always disappear if the stakes are large 
enough should be recognized for what it is – an assertion unsupported by any data.”  
Others, however, oppose this view and suggest that financial incentives are important in order 
to make experimental results reliable. Textbooks that guide beginners how to conduct economics 
experiments, for example, suggest “… motivate subjects by paying them in cash… Most of the 
payment  should  be  sensitively  linked  to  subjects’  actions  in  the  experiment”  (Friedman  and 
Sunder, 1994), and argue that “… what people say they would do in hypothetical situations does 
not always reflect what they actually do” (Friedman and Cassar, 2004).   
Several  review  articles  examined  the  issue  of  financial  incentives,  with  mixed  findings 
(Jenkins et al., 1998; Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Hertwig and Ortmann, 2003): in some cases 
financial incentives affect behavior and choices, while in other cases they do not. Camerer and 
Hogarth,  for  example,  considered  74  experiments  and  found  cases  in  which  the  level  of 
incentives affected behavior, but nevertheless there was no case in which higher incentives made 
rationality violations disappear.  
Given the controversy and the mixed results about the effect of financial incentives, and since 
the entire literature on relative thinking is based on experiments without financial incentives, it 
seemed  important  to  test  whether  the  bias  of  relative  thinking  exists  also  when  financial 
incentives are present, or even better, in real-world situations, where decisions make a difference 
for the subject. Doing so is the purpose of this article.    7
The article is organized as follows. The next section presents a field experiment that creates a 
real-world situation where relative thinking matters. People could buy a bagel or a bagel with 
cream cheese. The bagel’s price varied between treatments, but the extra cost of the cream cheese 
was kept constant, thus creating the possibility of detecting relative thinking. Section 3 describes 
a  hypothetical-scenario  counterpart  to  the  field  experiment,  which  was  used  to  reinforce  the 
conclusion about the effect of financial incentives on relative thinking. Section 4 addresses the 
issue of the potential correlation between the willingness to pay for the bagel and for the cream 
cheese, and the last section discusses the implications of the findings.  
2. A Field Experiment with Bagels and Cream Cheese 
The experimental evidence for relative thinking can be stated as follows: when consumers 
have  to  choose  between  two  differentiated  goods,  they  consider  not  only  the  absolute  price 
difference, but also the relative price difference, even when the latter should be irrelevant. For 
example, in Tversky and Kahneman (1981), the differentiation comes from the different location 
of the two stores, and in Azar (2004) it comes from the characteristics of the goods (for example, 
the time departure of the flight). The aim in this article was therefore to create a setting that will 
allow subjects to choose between two differentiated products, where the differentiation between 
the two goods is constant and does not depend on the good's price.
7 The setting that was chosen 
for the experiment was to sell bagels: the low-quality good was just a bagel, and the high-quality 
                                                 
7 For example, the differentiation between a good with 1-year warranty and a good with 3-year warranty is not 
independent of the good's price, because the value of the warranty is higher when the good's price is higher. Then 
relative price differences are relevant and it can no longer be argued that paying attention to them expresses biased 
decision making.    8
good was a bagel with cream cheese. Fresh bagels were obtained from a nearby grocery store, 
and the cream cheese offered was a 1-oz individually-packed serving of Kraft’s Philadelphia 
cream cheese.  
The experiment was first conducted by selling bagels with and without cream cheese in the 
main building of the Kellogg School of Management (at the Evanston Campus of Northwestern 
University). A few months later, in order to verify the robustness of the results, it was replicated 
in the lobby of Tech building at Northwestern University. In both places, there are often similar 
occasions in which students sell various things, so the subjects did not find the bagels' offering 
unnatural.  
In each location, the experiment was conducted on two different days. On one day, a bagel 
alone was sold for $0.30, and a bagel with cream cheese was sold for $0.50. On the other day, 
bagels were offered for $0.05, and bagels with cream cheese for $0.25. Cream cheese alone could 
not be purchased. The bagels and cream cheese were presented on a table, and the potential 
buyers could easily observe them before deciding whether and what to purchase. In Kellogg's 
building the experiment was conducted each day from 8:45 until 15:30, and in the Tech building 
it was run between 8:45 and 14:00 on both days. Each customer could buy only one bagel (either 
with or without cream cheese). In total, on the four days, 171 bagels were sold, of them 124 with 
cream cheese. 
Both buildings are among the biggest ones of Northwestern University and each serves a very 
large number of students. Combined with the fact that the experiment took place on different 
days of the week, this implies that the chances that the same person purchased bagels on both 
days are negligible, and the experiment can therefore be thought of as being very close to a 
between-subjects field experiment.    9
Let us consider one location, and compare what happens on the two experiment days. The 
difference between the low-quality and the high-quality good is constant (the cream cheese), and 
the price difference between the goods is constant ($0.20). Some consumers may prefer the bagel 
without cream cheese for dietary or other reasons. Since it is also cheaper, they should purchase a 
bagel without cream cheese. The proportion of these buyers to the total number of buyers is 
independent of the bagel’s price, so it should be similar on both days. Those who like to have 
cream cheese on their bagels should compare the gain in utility from having cream cheese to the 
gain in utility they can get by using the $0.20 (that they save if they give up the cream cheese) for 
other purposes.  The percentage of people for whom the utility from having additional $0.20 
exceeds the utility from the cream cheese is independent of the bagel's price, and should therefore 
be similar on both days. Let us denote the number of people who buy a bagel with cream cheese 
by C and the number of those who buy only the bagel by B. If people do not exhibit relative 
thinking, it follows from the explanation above that C/(B+C) should be similar on both days.  
If people exhibit relative thinking, however, they also compare the $0.20 required to add 
cream cheese to the price of the bagel (or to the price of the bagel with cream cheese; this does 
not change the prediction). Consequently, the $0.20 seems a larger amount when the bagel is sold 
for $0.05 than when it is sold for $0.30. Therefore, if people exhibit relative thinking, C/(B+C) 
should be lower when the bagels are sold for $0.05, because the relative addition for cream 
cheese is larger in this case. Did people exhibit relative thinking in the experiment? The left 
columns in Table 1 show that they did not. 
   10
Table 1: Experimental Results 











Low-price treatment          
Bagel for $0.05  15  18  33  31 
Bagel with cream cheese for $0.25  31  64  95  82 
Percentage adding cream cheese  67.4%  78.0%  74.2%  72.6% 
High-price treatment          
Bagel for $0.30  7  7  14  18 
Bagel with cream cheese for $0.50  9  20  29  83 
Percentage adding cream cheese  56.3%  74.1%  67.4%  82.2% 
Statistical tests for difference 
between the two price treatments  
       
p-value (logit)  0.217  0.335  0.195  0.049 
p-value (probit)  0.213  0.336  0.197  0.048 
p-value (OLS)  0.216  0.337  0.196  0.048 
Comment:  The  reported  p-values  are  the  one-tailed  p-values  of  the  coefficient  of  HIGH  (a 
dummy variable which equals 1 in the high-price treatment) in a regression where the dummy 
variable CHEESE (1 if the subject purchased also cream cheese, 0 if only a bagel) is regressed on 
HIGH and a constant.  
   11
Not surprisingly, we can see that when prices were lower, more people purchased bagels 
(with or without cream cheese). More important and interesting, however, is the examination of 
the percentage of people who add cream cheese. The results show that the percentage of buyers 
who decided to add the cream cheese was in fact higher when the bagel's price was lower - in the 
opposite direction to the prediction of relative thinking. The percentage difference between the 
two  treatments  (67.4%  vs.  74.2%  in  the  combined  sample),  however,  is  not  statistically 
significant at any conventional level of significance, as the p-values reported in Table 1 indicate. 
Consequently, the null hypothesis that the bagel's price has no effect on the decision whether to 
add  the  cream  cheese  cannot  be  rejected.  That  is,  consumer  behavior  in  the  experiment  is 
consistent  with  rational-choice  theory.  The  experiment  failed  to  document  a  bias  of  relative 
thinking, despite the robustness of this bias in experiments involving hypothetical questions.  
Replicating the results in the two buildings, in addition to increasing the sample size, has 
another  advantage. The  Tech building serves undergraduate  and  graduate students in various 
disciplines. The Kellogg building serves mostly MBA students. This implies that on average the 
income of buyers in the Kellogg building is much higher than that of buyers in the Tech building. 
The  results  in  both  places  being  qualitatively  similar  suggest that  they  seem  to be  robust  to 
income level variation.  
3. The Hypothetical Scenario Counterpart 
While the experimental design was chosen in a way that mimics the hypothetical scenarios 
used in previous studies in which relative thinking was documented, it seemed a good idea to test 
for relative thinking in a hypothetical scenario equivalent to the field experiment, in order to 
reinforce the conclusion that the introduction of financial incentives is the reason that relative   12
thinking  disappeared  in  the  field  experiment.  To  do  so,  378  undergraduate  students  at 
Northwestern  University  answered  one  of  two  versions  of  the  following  question  (prices  in 
brackets represent the second treatment):  
 
You enter one of the buildings on campus one day and find a person sitting at a table with 
bagels  and  cream  cheese  packs.  You  can  buy  there  one  of  the  following  two  options 
(limited to one bagel per customer): 
(1) A bagel for $0.30 [$0.05]. 
(2) A bagel with cream cheese (a 1-oz individually-packed serving of Kraft’s Philadelphia 
cream cheese) for $0.50 [$0.25]. 
Assuming that you must buy one of the two options, which one do you prefer? (Please 
circle one option) 
(1) The bagel only for $0.30 [$0.05].   
(2) The bagel with the cream cheese for $0.50 [$0.25].  
 
Would you purchase your preferred option if you had the choice between buying it and not 
buying a bagel at all? (Please circle one answer)    Yes / No  
 
Among the 378 subjects, 214 indicated that they would purchase their preferred option if they 
also had the choice not to buy at all. Because the sample in the field experiment includes only 
people who decided to make a purchase, only these 214 subjects are analyzed, in order to make 
the results comparable to the field experiment. As the right column in Table 1 reveals, in the 
high-price treatment 82.2% of the subjects wanted to pay the extra $0.20 and add the cream 
cheese, whereas in the low-price treatment only 72.6% wanted to do so. This difference, which is   13
statistically significant at the 5% level, is consistent with the relative thinking bias found in other 
hypothetical-scenario studies in the literature. Because the $0.20 addition for the cream cheese 
seems more significant in relative terms when compared to $0.05 than when compared to $0.30, 
more subjects choose to add the cream cheese when the bagel’s price is $0.30. The conclusion is 
that the non-existence of relative thinking bias in the field experiment seems to be the result of 
the introduction of financial incentives and not of the specific decision problem.  
To further verify the robustness of this conclusion, three regressions that include the data 
from  both  the  hypothetical  and  the  field  experiments  were  run.  The  dependent  variable  was 
CHEESE (1 if the subject purchased also cream cheese, 0 if only a bagel) and the independent 
variables  were  HIGH  (1  in  the  high-price  treatment,  0  otherwise),  REAL  (1  in  the  field 
experiment, 0 in the hypothetical experiment), and REALHIGH (the value of REAL*HIGH). 
Because HIGH captures relative thinking, the coefficient of the interaction term REALHIGH 
indicates  the  difference  in  relative  thinking  between  the  field  and  the  hypothetical-scenario 
experiments. The coefficient of REALHIGH is negative in all three regressions (suggesting more 
relative thinking in the hypothetical experiment than in the field experiment), and its one-tailed p-
value  is  0.045  in  the  OLS  regression,  0.041  in  the  logit  regression,  and  0.042  in  the  probit 
regression. These results further support the conclusion that there is a statistically significant 
difference  in  relative  thinking  behavior  between  the  field  experiment  and  the  hypothetical-
scenario experiment. This suggests that introducing financial incentives eliminates the relative 
thinking behavior, at least in the context explored in this experiment, of choosing between two 
differentiated goods.   14
4. The Correlation between Willingness to Pay for the Bagel and for the Cream Cheese 
One issue that might affect the results is the sample selection in the two price treatments. The 
average willingness to pay (WTP) for the bagel of people who make a purchase when the bagel’s 
price is $0.05 is lower than the average WTP of purchasing customers when the bagel’s price is 
$0.30. This is because the purchase decision indicates that the WTP is higher than the price, and a 
higher price then implies a higher average WTP. The failure to detect relative thinking in the field 
experiment could, theoretically, occur even if people do exhibit relative thinking, if there is an 
opposite effect that comes from the correlation between the WTP for the bagel and the WTP for 
the  cream  cheese.  In  particular,  if  this  correlation  is  negative,  then  buyers  in  the  low-price 
treatment (who have on average lower WTP for the bagel than buyers in the high-price treatment 
as explained above) have a higher average WTP for the cream cheese, and this should result in a 
larger tendency to add the cream cheese in the low-price treatment – in opposite direction to the 
relative thinking effect.  
Fortunately, the data from the hypothetical-scenario question can assist us in ruling out this 
possibility, using the responses to the question “Would you purchase your preferred option if you 
had the choice between buying it and not buying a bagel at all?” In total, we have eight different 
possible outcomes, because there are three variables, each with two possible values. A person 
could prefer a bagel only (B) or a bagel with cream cheese (C); he could prefer purchasing (P) or 
not (N) if he had the option; and he might be in the high-price (H) or low-price (L) treatments.  
Obviously, people in group C (i.e., those who added cream cheese) have on average a higher 
WTP for the cream cheese than people in group B, because a person should choose to add the 
cream cheese if and only if his WTP for it is higher than $0.20, since the cost of adding the cream 
cheese in all treatments is $0.20. Thus, the dummy variable CHEESE, which equals 1 if the   15
subject added cream cheese, is a proxy for the WTP for the cream cheese, because the two are 
positively correlated. We can now turn to creating a proxy for the WTP for the bagel by using the 
subject’s decision of P vs. N and his treatment (H vs. L). The lowest average WTP belongs to 
those who did not want to make a purchase even at the low price (N & L). The next lowest WTP 
is  in  the  group  that  did  not  purchase  at  the  high  price  (N  &  H).  Next  we  have  those  who 
purchased at the low price (P & L), and the highest average WTP belongs to those who purchased 
at the high price (P & H).  
For  example, if  we  focus  on those  in  group  B  and  assume  that  the  WTP  for  a  bagel  is 
distributed uniformly over the range $0 - $0.50, we get:
8 AWTP (N & L) = E(WTP | WTP < 
$0.05) = $0.025; AWTP (N & H) = E(WTP | WTP < $0.30) = $0.15; AWTP (P & L) = E(WTP | 
WTP > $0.05) = $0.275; and AWTP (P & H) = E(WTP | WTP > $0.30) = $0.40. While obtaining 
these specific values depends on the assumption about the distribution of the WTP, the ranking 
between the four groups applies for any distribution of the WTP. Therefore we can define a proxy 
variable AWTP, which equals 0 for (N & L), 1 for (N & H), 2 for (P & L) and 3 for (P & H), and 
these ordinal values capture the average level of the WTP for the bagel in the four groups. 
What is left to be done is to examine whether there is a statistically significant negative 
correlation  between  AWTP  and  CHEESE.  Regressing  CHEESE  on  AWTP  (and  a  constant) 
shows that the correlation is in fact positive, and is not statistically significant (the p-value of the 
coefficient of AWTP is between 0.298 – 0.302 in logit, probit, and OLS estimations). Therefore, 
the hypothesis that in the field experiment there exists relative thinking which is not evident due 
                                                 
8 AWTP stands for “average willingness to pay.” E( ) means the expected value of the expression in parentheses. The 
symbol | means “conditional on.” The conditioning is a straightforward result of the decision to purchase or not and 
the price treatment.    16
to a counter-effect that results from negative correlation between the WTP for bagels and the 
WTP for cream cheese is not supported by the data.  
5. Conclusion 
A very common consumer decision problem is the choice between differentiated goods or 
services, making it important to understand how consumers make these choices. The evidence on 
relative thinking suggests that when consumers consider purchasing one of two differentiated 
goods, both the absolute price difference and the relative price difference affect their decision. 
Similarly,  as  Tversky  and  Kahneman  (1981)  and  others  showed,  when  consumers  consider 
whether to make a certain effort to save a certain amount on a good they want to buy, they are 
affected not only by the absolute savings but also by the savings relative to the good's price, even 
though the latter should be irrelevant. Many studies show this behavior, but all of them are based 
on hypothetical questions and do not involve financial incentives to make correct decisions.  
To  examine  whether  the  relative  thinking  bias  is  robust  to  the  introduction  of  financial 
incentives, a field experiment was conducted. Bagels served as a low-quality good, and bagels 
with cream cheese served as a high-quality good. The extra amount needed in order to purchase 
the  high-quality  good  was  kept  constant,  whereas  the  bagel's  price  varied  across  treatments. 
According to the relative thinking behavior, the percentage of customers who choose to buy 
bagels with cream cheese should be lower when the bagel's price is lower (because the extra cost 
of the cream cheese relative to the bagel's price is higher). In two different replications of the 
experiment, however, the opposite result was obtained: a higher percentage of buyers added the 
cream cheese when the bagel's price was lower. The difference in the proportion of buyers adding 
the cream cheese in the two treatments, however, is not statistically significant. Consequently, the   17
results in the field experiment are consistent with the prediction of rational-choice theory (which 
predicts that the percentage of consumers who add the cream cheese should be similar in both 
treatments), but not with the prediction of relative thinking.  
To verify that the disappearance of relative thinking in the field experiment is due to the 
financial  incentives  that  were  introduced  and  not  to  other  differences  between  the  consumer 
decision  and  decisions  used  in  previous  studies  (which  documented  relative  thinking  in 
hypothetical  questions)
9,  a  hypothetical-scenario  version  of  the  experiment  was  run.  In  that 
version, relative thinking was documented, suggesting that indeed the introduction of financial 
incentives seems to be the reason for the disappearance of relative thinking.   
Do the results imply that relative thinking is a phenomenon that only occurs with hypothetical 
questions, but  disappears  with financial  incentives?  This  is  an  intriguing question. It  will  be 
surprising to find that this is the case, given that many experiments with hypothetical questions 
found a significant behavior of relative thinking, and given that Camerer and Hogarth (1999) 
concluded, based on 74 experiments, that “no replicated study has made rationality violations 
disappear purely by raising incentives.” The field experiment reported above, however, seemed to 
make  the  rationality  violation  of  relative  thinking  disappear  by  introducing  incentives.
10 
                                                 
9 In the field experiment reported in this article, the cream cheese is a complementary good to the bagel, and a bagel 
with cream cheese is superior (for most people) to a bagel without cream cheese. In much of the earlier literature the 
relative thinking is documented when the consumer has the option to save money on the purchase of a good by going 
to a cheaper store. This is a different context. However, Azar (2004) observes relative thinking also in consumer 
decisions involving differentiated goods (as is the case here).  
10 Since subjects purchase the bagel with real money, this provides them incentives to make correct choices (choices 
that reflect their true preferences); this is also the purpose of providing financial incentives in lab experiments. One 
advantage of field experiments over lab experiments, however, is the higher degree of external validity: it is easier to   18
Moreover,  the  results  were  replicated  in  two  different locations and the  hypothetical  version 
showed that relative thinking does exist in this decision problem without financial incentives. 
Nevertheless,  it  might  be  too  early  to  conclude  that  relative  thinking  disappears  with  the 
introduction of financial incentives, because so far this is the only study that tests for relative 
thinking when presenting financial incentives. Possibly the small amounts of money involved in 
the purchase decision or the very cheap price of the bagel in the low-price treatment ($0.05) 
affect decisions in a certain way, and somewhat different results will be obtained in experiments 
involving  larger  amounts  of  money.  I  hope  that  this  article  will  encourage  others  to  design 
additional experiments that test for the effects of financial incentives on relative thinking, and 
will thus promote our knowledge of these effects further. 
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